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RICO Convictions

1. RICO, Reporter's Privilege And The Boston College PointShaving Scandal
In United States v. Burke,' the convictions of Rocco Perla, Anthony
Perla, James Burke, and Paul Mazzei2 for conspiracy to violate RICO,3
conspiracy to commit sports bribery, 4 and interstate travel with intent to
commit bribery, 5 were affirmed by the Second Circuit.
The convictions arose from a "point-shaving scandal" created by
Rocco Perla and his brother, Anthony Perla. The Perlas contacted Paul
Mazzei to establish a betting syndicate. Mazzei contacted Henry Hill
who, in turn, contacted James Burke. Burke and Hill were to function as
''protection" in the event the bookmakers became aware of the "scam."
The "inside man" was Richard Kuhn, a high school friend of Rocco
Perla and a key member of the 1978-79 Boston College basketball team.
The "scheme" was to work as follows: The conspirators would select a basketball game for which there was a wide projected point spread;
Kuhn would be responsible for assuring that Boston College fell short of
the point spread; the conspirators would have placed bets against Boston
College, and be assured of winning; and Kuhn was to be paid a "bonus"
of $2500 for successful efforts.
The conspiracy met with mixed results. 6 In the first game, against
Providence, Boston College was favored to win by six to seven points.
Kuhn was to keep the winning margin within that point spread, but an
early Boston lead resulted in a nineteen point victory. Disappointed with
the outcome of the game, the conspirators hired Ernie Cobb, the leading
scorer for Boston College, as an additional participant.7
1. 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
2. Paul Mazzei filed a separate appeal in United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.)
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983). Mazzei will be discussed later in this article.
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). RICO is an acronym for "Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations," the heading of Title 9 of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 901-904, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48 (1970).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 224 (1982).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1982).
6. The conspiracy lost money in the Boston College games played against Providence and
Holy Cross; money was made on the Harvard, UCLA, University of Connecticut and Fordham games; on the St. John's game, the conspiracy broke even. 700 F.2d at 74-75.
7. Id. at 74. Fortunately, another key player for Boston College, Joseph Beaulieu, refused to participate in the scheme.
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The point-fixing conspiracy continued until the Holy Cross game of
February 10, 1979. Holy Cross and Boston College were traditional rivals, and bookies generally accepted big bets on the game. Holy Cross
was favored to win, and the defendants bet a large sum that Holy Cross
would win by a margin greater than the point spread. Whether because
of the excitement of the game or the deep-rooted school loyalty of Kuhn
and Cobb, Holy Cross won by only two points. The conspiracy ended on
this unsuccessful note.8
Meanwhile, Henry Hill had been engaged in activities of his own.
On December 8, 1978, one of the largest robberies in the United States
took place at the Lufthansa cargo warehouse at Kennedy Airport.9
Henry Hill was implicated in the robbery.l° Hill agreed to relate the full
story of the point-shaving scandal in return for full immunity and support of the federal officials in his state indictment on drug conspiracy
charges." Based principally upon the testimony of Hill,' 2 defendants
Burke, Kuhn, Mazzei, and both Perlas were convicted.' 3
The defendants appealed eight issues, '"of which two-the reporter's
privilege and the pre-indictment publicity-are of special concern to the
entertainment industry.
A.

The Reporter's Privilege

Henry Hill was apparently very pleased with his participation in the
scheme. Not only was he eager to relate the story of his involvement to
law enforcement officials,' 5 but he also co-authored an article for Sports
Illustrated magazine relating the details of the point-shaving scandal.' 6
In order to impeach Hill when he took the stand, defendant Burke
subpoenaed Time, Inc., the parent corporation of Sports Illustrated,
8. Id. at 75.
9. The criminals involved in this robbery absconded with five million dollars in cash and
one million dollars in jewelry. See id. at 75 n.5; see also United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922
(2d Cir. 1980).
10. 700 F.2d at 75.
11. Id. It was after Hill was indicted for the drug conspiracy charges that he was implicated in the Lufthansa robbery.
12. Other witnesses for the Government included Boston College players James Sweeney
and Joseph Beaulieu, and Kuhn's former roomate, Barbara Reed. See id.
13. Id.
14. Other issues included the district court's instruction on a partial verdict; a Rule 30
claim made when Kuhn's counsel did not understand a court ruling; the district court's refusal
to instruct the jury on defendant's theory of the case; admissions made by Kuhn prior to
indictment; and implications made by a government agent as he read Kuhn's admission.
15. 700 F.2d at 75.
16. Hill & Looney, How I Put The Fix In, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 16, 1981, at 14.
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seeking all documents, tape recordings, and notes that related to the article. On the motion of Time, Inc., the trial court quashed the subpoena
on the basis of the reporter's privilege not to reveal his sources. 7 The
district court reasoned "that Burke had not satisfied his burden of showing that the subpoenaed documents were highly material and necessary
to his case and not obtainable from other sources.""8 The Second Circuit
affirmed.' 9
The court applied its established civil law test to the facts of the
case:

20

"[T]o protect the important interests of reporters and the public in preserving the confidentiality of journalists' sources, disclosures may be ordered only upon a clear and specific showing
that the information is: highly material and relevant, necessary
or critical to the maintenance of the claim, and not obtainable
' 21
from other available sources.

A difficult burden is placed upon a party who attempts to subpoena
a reporter's investigation. If the reporter or publisher is not a party to
the suit, a subpoena must first comply with third party non-privilege requirements.22 The court must then balance the "'legitimate competing
interests of a newsman's claim to First Amendment protection from
forced disclosure of his confidential sources

.

. .

against the defendant's

claim to a fair trial which is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.' "23
Owing to the strong protection given by United States courts to freedom of the press,2 4 the reporter's privilege is most often invoked with
17. 700 F.2d at 76.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 78.
20. For the positions of other courts, see Annot., 99 A.L.R.3D 37, 60-71 (1980).
21. 700 F.2d at 76-77 (quoting In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 680 F.2d 5, 7
(2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 909 (1982)).
22. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c). These requirements include: (1)that the documents are
evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of
trial by due diligence; (3) that the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and inspection in advance of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend
unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4) that the application is made in good faith and is not
intended as a general "fishing expedition." United States v. Cuthbertson, 651 F.2d 189, 192
(3d Cir.) (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699-700 (1974)), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1056 (1981).
23. Burke, 700 F.2d at 77 (quoting United States v. Orlini, 424 F. Supp. 229, 232
(E.D.N.Y. 1976), affid merr, 559 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977)).
24. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). "'The interest of the public
here outweighs the interest of appellant or any other individual. The protection of the public
requires not merely discussion, but information.' " Id. at 272 (quoting Sweeney v. Patterson,
128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1942)).
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success.
It is axiomatic, and a principle fundamental to our constitutional way of life, that where the press remains free so too will a
people remain free. Freedom of the press may be stifled by direct or, more subtly, by indirect restraints. Happily, the First
Amendment tolerates neither, absent a concern so compelling
as to override the precious rights of freedom of speech and the
press.2 5
Thus, the reporter who wrote about the Church of Scientology using
informants within the FBI was protected from disclosure when charges
were brought against the Church; 26 the reporter who documented the life
of Karen Silkwood was protected when Silkwood's executor brought a
wrongful death action based upon the information collected by the reporter; 27 the reporter who interviewed a discriminating real estate agent
was protected in a class-action alleging "block-busting" discrimination;2"
29
the publisher of a trade publication was protected in an antitrust suit;
and a reporter was protected in an action under the Privacy Act 30 from

revealing his sources, who had invaded plaintiff's privacy.3 1
A further requirement to defeat the reporter's privilege is that the
subpoenaed information is "not obtainable from other available
sources." 3 2 Justice Brennan has indicated in a recent Supreme Court de25. Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 785 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966
(1973). In Baker, reporter Alfred Balk wrote an article, "Confessions of a Block Buster," for
the Saturday Evening Post. This article consisted of an interview with a Chicago real estate
agent who participated in discriminatory real estate activities. A federal class action was
brought against Chicago real estate agents alleging a long-standing pattern of discrimination in
the sale of housing. The plaintiffs subpoenaed Balk to force him to reveal his sources. The
court refused to enforce the subpoena.
26. United States v. Hubbard, 493 F. Supp. 202 (D.D.C. 1979). The reporter, Timothy
Robinson, was writing a book on the Church of Scientology.
27. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977).
28. Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
29. In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 680 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982). In Petroleum Products, the states of Arizona, California, Florida,
Oregon, and Washington brought an antitrust action against 17 oil companies. Believing that
a conspiracy to fix prices was facilitated by the trade publication, Platt's Oilgram PriceReport,
published by McGraw-Hill, McGraw-Hill was served with a subpoena to produce all documents relating to the publication. The Second Circuit reversed a contempt order by the district court on the grounds that the states had no basis to support their assertion and that the
states failed in their burden of first seeking the information elsewhere. 680 F.2d at 8.
30. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1982).
31. Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The plaintiff in Zerilli alleged that
information gained in a wiretap regarding alleged Mafia connections was given to Seth Kantor
of the Detroit News. Plaintiffs motion to counsel discovery was denied by the district court
and the denial affirmed by the court of appeals.
32. Burke, 700 F.2d at 77.
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cision that even if a party would be required to take sixty-five depositions
to uncover information held by a reporter, this cost would not justify
finding the information unobtainable from other sources.33
Instances where the reporter's privilege is defeated are generally limited to circumstances where the newspaper is sued for libel, and the
source cited has not been uncovered. Invoking the privilege in such instances would be unwarranted, for the source is the "heart" of the
claim. 34
A further and more alarming instance where the privilege is often
defeated is when the Government attacks the privilege. Thus, a reporter
who interviews criminals and reports criminal activity can be hailed
before a grand jury and be required to reveal his sources.3 5 In balancing
the first amendment interest with the government's interest in fighting
crime, the Supreme Court, in Branzburg v. Hayes,36 has stated "[t]he
preference of anonymity of those confidential informants involved in actual criminal conduct is presumably a product of their desire to escape
criminal prosecution, and this preference, while understandable, is
33. In re Roche, 448 U.S. 1312 (1980). In Roche, a reporter was held in contempt for
refusing to reveal the sources of a story he wrote regarding state judge misconduct. The story
directly led to the filing of formal proceedings against a judge. Justice Brennan granted a stay
of enforcement pending a writ of certiorari.
34. See Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 938 (1974), in
which an article, purportedly based upon eyewitness reports, alleged that the UMW president
removed or destroyed incriminating documents. In an action based upon libel and slander, the
newspaper refused to reveal the source, claiming the reporter's privilege. The court of appeal,
in affirming the district court's order to reveal sources, reasoned that the issue of the informant
went to the heart of the suit and that the complete uncertainty of the informant relieved the
plaintiffs of the burden of exhausting available sources. 492 F.2d at 636-38.
See also Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958), in
which a newspaper claimed to have based its allegedly defamatory article on the information
given by a CBS vice-president. When depositions of all vice-presidents failed to reveal the
informant, the court ordered the reporter to reveal his sources. 259 F.2d at 550.
35. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). In three cases, reporters were ordered to
reveal the identity of their sources. The first was a newsman who observed people making
marijuana cigarettes. The second involved a Massachusets newsman who refused to testify
before a grand jury. The third concerned a reporter assigned to cover the Black Panther Party
and other black militant groups. The Court based its decision on a balancing of the need for
freedom of the press with the government's interest in crime prevention. Id. at 700-01. In
reasoning that the impact of its decision would be minimal, the Court stated:
Only where news sources themselves are implicated in crime or possess information
relevant to the grand jury's task need they or the reporter be concerned about grand
jury subpoenas. Nothing before us indicates that a large number or percentage of all
confidential news sources falls into either category and would in any way be deterred
by our holding. . ..
Id. at 69 (emphasis in original).
36. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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hardly deserving of constitutional protection.""
Unfortunately, the reasons for the reporter's privilege3 8 do not cease
to exist when the Government seeks to revoke the privilege. Significantly, it was precisely to protect citizens from the federal government
that the Bill of Rights was passed.3 9 Ironically, had the Government
been the party attempting to revoke the privilege in Burke, the result
would most likely have been different." According the government
more favorable treatment when determining the scope and coverage of
the Bill of Rights has alarming implications. Fortunately, Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in Branzburg, wrote in favor of the balancing test,4 and his opinion has been cited by courts which have expanded
the reporter's privilege.4 2 When the government's interest in crime prevention is balanced against the first amendment, concern for our "constitutional way of life" indicates that the first amendment should prevail.4 3
In applying the test to Burke, the Second Circuit stated that there
was "no legally-principled reason for drawing a distinction between civil
and criminal cases when considering whether [to apply the reporter's
privilege]."" In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that a further incentive to apply the privilege in criminal cases is to encourage
investigation and exposure of wrongdoing. 5 However, other circuits
have disagreed. "Although Branzburg may limit the scope of the reporter's First Amendment privilege in criminal proceedings, [the District
37. Id. at 691.
38. Compelling a reporter to disclose the identity of a confidential source raises obvious First Amendment problems. The First Amendment guarantees a free press primarily because of the important role it can play as "a vital source of public
information."... "The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people."... Without a unfettered press, citizens would be
far less able to make informed political, social, and economic choices. But the press'

function as a vital source of information is weakened whenever the ability of journalists to gather news is impaired. Compelling a reporter to disclose the identity of a
source may significantly interfere with this news gathering ability; journalists frequently depend on informants to gether news, and confidentiality is often essential to
establishing a relationship with an informant.
Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 710-11 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citations and footnotes omitted).
39. See Barron v. Mayor & City Council, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
40. See supra note 35.
41. 408 U.S. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
42. See United States v. Hubbard, 493 F. Supp. 202 (D.D.C. 1979). "IT]he vote which
determined the outcome in Branzburg was cast by Justice Powell, and his concurring opinion
has inspired the courts to engage in a case-by-case balancing of interests in order to determine
whether a reporter will be required to testify." Id. at 204.
43. Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 785 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
966 (1973).
44. 700 F.2d at 77.
45. Id.
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of Columbia Circuit] has previously held that in civil cases, where the
public interest in efffective criminal law enforcement is absent, that case
is not controlling." 4 6 Additionally, the Supreme Court has reasoned that
47
it is better to do something about crime than just to write about it.
However, the Second Circuit's position, in applying the same test for
criminal and civil cases, is the better reasoned. Undoubtedly, more crime
would be discovered and brought to justice by allowing the media the
freedom to investigate criminal activity, than by allowing the Government (or other third parties) a shortcut in discovery. 48 Furthermore, the
reasoning of the Second Circuit would hold the Government to the same
test as private parties. In view of the "chilling effect" that would result
from the Government's piercing of a reporter's confidentiality, this result
is to be desired.
B.

Pre-indictmentPublicity as Grounds to Dismiss an Indictment

In Burke, the defendants also asserted that their right to a fair trial
was impaired by the publicity generated by the Sports Illustrated article
and that reversible error was committed when the district court refused a
request for a pre-indictment hearing.4 9 The court found no error, 50 reasoning that the vague and general terms used by the defendants to show
prejudice to the grand jury were "clearly insufficient to warrant reversal
under prevailing law."'"
Defendants took on a heavy burden.52 An indictment will not be
dismissed merely because a juror has knowledge of the case or even a
preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused. "It is
sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a
46. Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
47. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 692.

48. Compelled disclosure of confidential sources unquestionably threatens a journalist's ability to secure information that is made available to him only on a confidential

basis. . . . The deterrent effect such disclosure is likely to have upon future "undercover" investigative reporting, the dividends of which are revealed in articles such as
Balk's, threatens freedom of the press and the public's need to be informed. It
thereby undermines values which traditionally have been protected by federal courts
applying federal public policy.
Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966

(1973).
49.
50.
51.
52.

700 F.2d at 82.
Id.
Id.
A different standard is applied when determining whether publicity has affected a trial

jury verdict. See United States v. Nunan, 236 F.2d 576, 593 (2d Cir. 1956), cert denied, 353
U.S. 912 (1957), for a discussion of the different standards applied to the different proceedings.

LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5

verdict based on the evidence presented in court." 53 To dismiss an indictment, a "defendant must show not only that there was publicity but also
that such publicity caused prejudice and bias in the grand jurors and that
the indictment returned was the result of essential unfairness." 5 4 In
Burke, the defendants did not show any actual prejudice; they merely
reasoned that because of the widespread publicity, prejudice could be
presumed.
Further examples of the difficulty of this burden occurred when a
defendant was the subject of newspaper reports, television reports (including an eight-and-one-half hour report), and coverage in national
magazines;" when a former governor was indicted for mail fraud and
racketeering; 56 and when applied to the ABSCAM defendants, despite
the court's finding that the conduct of the government officers regarding
publicity "grossly improper and possibly illegal. . . ."", So heavy is the
burden of proving actual causation, that "[i]t does not appear that any
indictment has thus far been dismissed on this ground. '58 In upholding
indictments under such circumstances, however, criticisms of media coverage have been severe. 59
Despite the adverse impact of this burden on the entertainment industry, where charges against any well-known entertainer would generate significant publicity, such a result is to be desired. "To accept the
contention urged by [well-known] defendants as a rule of law certainly
would produce absurd results since no one who is prominent and well
known could be charged with the commission of any crime because the
charge against such a person no doubt would cause very large and widespread adverse publicity, precluding an indictment."'
Unfortunately,
added publicity and exposure are inherent in an entertainer's life, but
53. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961).
54. United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1033, 1061 (D. Md. 1976).
55. Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962) (no prejudice).
56. United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Md. 1976) (no prejudice).
57. United States v. Myers, 510 F. Supp. 323, 325 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
58. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. at 1061 citing 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE-CRIMINAL
RULES § 6.03(4), at 6-42.3 (2d ed. 1965).
59. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961):
This Court has not yet decided that the fair administration of criminal justice must
be subordinated to another safeguard of our constitutional system-freedom of the
press, properly conceived. The Court has not yet decided that, while convictions
must be reversed and miscarriages of justice result because the minds of jurors or
potential jurors were poisoned, the poisoner is constitutionally protected in plying his
trade.
Id. at 730 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
60. United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1033, 1062 (D. Md. 1976) (quoting United
States v. Hoffa, 205 F. Supp. 710, 717 (S.D. Fla.) affid sub nom Hoffa v. Lieb, 371 U.S. 892
(1962)).
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entertainers are not, by virtue of this exposure, constitutionally protected
from an indictment.
C.

"Enterprise"Element Defined

Paul Mazzei filed a separate appeal arguing that his RICO convic62
tion was in error. 6' The Court, however, affirmed his conviction.
RICO makes it unlawful "for any person . . .associated with any
enterprise. . . to conduct or participate. . . in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity ... 63
Therefore, a RICO conviction" depends upon two elements: (1) the
existence of an "enterprise ' 6 and (2) a "pattern of racketeering
66
activity.",
Mazzei did not dispute the district court finding a "pattern of racketeering activity." Rather, Mazzei asserted that the "enterprise" element
was not met. 67 The "enterprise" upon which the conviction was based
consisted of the activities of Henry Hill, James Burke, Richard Kuhn,
Rocco Perla, Tony Perla and Mazzei, in attempting to fix the Boston
College basketball games. 6' However, it was precisely this activity which
consisted of "the pattern of racketeering activity."' 69 Since RICO requires that both elements exist to sustain a conviction,7 ° Mazzei asserted
that evidence used to find "a pattern of racketeering activity" could not
be the same evidence used to find an "enterprise. '
Under Mazzei's assertion, a RICO conviction would be proper only
when the defendants were engaged in some form of association which
61. United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983).

62. Id. at 91.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982).
64. The Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is not limited to
criminal penalties. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) allows suit by "any person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962. . .shall recover threefold the damages he
sustains and the cost of suit, including reasonable attorney fees." Additionally, even though

RICO was intended to eliminate organized crime and its influences, a link to organized crime
is not a requisite to a RICO award. See United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091, 1096
(E.D. Penn. 1979); affid 605 F.2d 1199; cert. denied 444 U.S. 1072 (1980). See generally Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291 (1983).
65. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982).
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982).
67. Mazzei, 700 F.2d at 87.
68. Id. at 89.
69. Id.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982).
71. Mazzei, 700 F.2d at 88.
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exists beyond the "pattern of racketeering activity." 7 2 Therefore, had
these defendants been associated in a corporation, a cooperative,74 or
other informal association,7" and engaged in a "pattern of racketering
activity," a RICO conviction would lie. 76 However, if the only time an
enterprise exists is when individuals combine to engage in a "pattern of
racketeering activity," the activity is beyond the scope of RICO.7 7
The circuits are split on the definition and scope of "enterprise." 7
The Second Circuit has adopted a broad test, finding that proof of "the
pattern of racketeering activity" element can coalesce with proof of the
"enterprise" element.79 In this case, "[t]he prosecution showed that the
B.C. [Boston College] conspirators shared a common purpose-illegally
shaving points on B.C. games to maximize their chances of betting successfully on those games-and they functioned as a continuing unit, i.e.:
during the 1978-79 B.C. basketball season."'8 0 This fulfilled the "enterprise" requirement. 8"
To support its conclusion, the Second Circuit relied upon the legislative history of the act which supports a broad application.8 2 Additionally, the court relied upon the recent Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Turkett.13 Although Turkett was limited to the issue of whether
72. See United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 103 S. Ct. 1442
(1982).
73. See United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 988 (1 1th Cir. 1982). In Hartley, Treasure
Island, Inc., was convicted of violating RICO through a scheme of fixing the government
inspection process. Treasure Island was a major supplier of shrimp and other fish products to
the United States Government. The case apparently reminded Justice Fox of his overdue fishing vacation as he amusingly wrote: "[Defendants] appeal has launched this court into an
extensive fishing expedition undertaken by appellants . . . . The defendants . . . baited their
appellate hooks with a large assortment of tempting issues-fourteen by their count-in an
attempt to land the prize catch-a reversal. We found only two deserving a judicial nibble, but
none worthy of setting the hook. Upon reeling through this opinion, the appellants will unfortunately find their catch should be mounted as 'the one that got away.' (Convictions) Affirmed." Id. at 968.
74. See Bledsoe, 674 F.2d at 660.
75. The "enterprise" need not be legal. See United States v. Turkett, 452 U.S. 576, 593
(1981).
76. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), 1963 (1982).
77. See Mazzei, 700 F.2d at 88.
78. For an annotation of the positions of the other circuits, see United States v. Anderson,
626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980).
79. Mazzei, 700 F.2d at 89.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. "The provisions of this title... shall be liberally construed to effect its remedial purposes." Public Law 91-452 § 904(a) (1970).
83. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
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RICO encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises, 4 the
Court adopted a broad definition of the word enterprise.8 5 Stressing both
the remedial and preventative functions of the statute, the Supreme
Court stated: "The language of the statute . . . the most reliable evidence of its intent-reveals that Congress opted for a far broader definition of the word "enterprise," and we are unconvinced by anything in the
legislative history that this definition should be given less than its full
effect."" 6
For authority, Mazzei relied upon the Eighth Circuit position which
holds that an "enterprise" must be proved separate from the "pattern of
racketeering activity. '"87 The basis for this conclusion is that the Congressional intent does not indicate a desire to radically expand federal
conspiracy law.8 8
However, the position of the Second Circuit is more compatible with
both the language and legislative history of the statute. RICO makes it
unlawful for "any" enterprise to conduct its affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity.8 9 The repetition of "any" is indicative of the broad
scope of the statute, and supports the conclusion that "any enterprise"
can include an enterprise with its sole purpose to engage in a pattern of
racketeering activity.90 Furthermore, since the Turkett decision has held
that "any enterprise" includes an illegal enterprise,9 1 it would appear
anomalous to exclude those illegal enterprises which engage only in racketeering activities.
The Eight Circuit reasoning has led to some curious results. RICO
was specifically targeted against organized crime activities.92 Although
purporting to follow to follow Congressional intent,9 3 the circuit has reversed the convictions of: defendants engaged in a network of bribery and
fraud;9 4 defendants engaged in a series of fraudulent sales and bribes;9 5
and the self-dealing activities of a retirement home management com84. Id. at 578.

85. Id. at 593.
86. Id.
87. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1372.

88. Id. at 1369.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982); See also Mazzei, 700 F.2d at 90, citing United States v. Altese,
542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1039 (1976).
90. Mazzei, 700 F.2d at 90.
91. Turkett, 452 U.S. at 593.
92. Public Law 91-452 § 1 (1970).
93. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1369.
94. Id. at 1375.
95. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647.
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pany, which defrauded senior citizens out of their living standards.9 6
97
These results hardly comport with the Congressional mandate.
Significantly, this issue has already been addressed by the Supreme
Court, albeit indirectly, in the Turkett decision.9 8 The Second Circuit
definition of "enterprise" is consistent with the Turkett decision. 99 The
Eighth Circuit's narrow application of "enterprise" is reasoned upon an
absence of an explicit statement by Congress of its intent to expand federal jurisdiction." ° This position is similar to the disreputed form of judicial activism referred to as "Lochnerizing."'' This activism occurred
when a court would substitute its societal judgment in place of the judgment of the legislature. 0 2 The consequences of this train of activism 0 3
have led to its complete condemnation."0 The Eighth Circuit, however,
in refusing to accept the unambiguous language of the statute,' 05 has res06
urrected Lochner.1
The real threat of RICO, however, is its civil applications. 0 7 Mazzei is an example of RICO's expansion into areas of fraud previously
dominated by state law.'0 8 This expansion is likewise present in civil
RICO actions, not only in areas dominated by state law, but as a supplement to preexisting federal law."° With treble damages and attorney
96. See Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982).
97. This applies both to the intent to eradicate organized crime, Public Law 91-452 § 1
(1970); and the intent that the title be liberally construed, Public Law 91-452(a) (1970).
98. Turkett, 452 U.S. at 593.
99. Id.; See also 700 F.2d at 89.
100. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1379.
101. Derived from the decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), where the
Supreme Court invalidated a New York statute which limited the number of hours in which a
baker could work to 60 hours per week.
102. See Id. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
103. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (invalidating a federal statute enacted
to restrict child labor); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating a federal

statute designed to restrict the number of hours for coal miners); the actions of the Court also
influenced President Franklin D. Roosevelt to introduce his Court Packing Plan. See Los
Angeles Times, Feb. 6, 1937, at 1, col. 8.
104. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
105. Altese, 542 F.2d at 106.
106. Lochner dealt with the use of the Constitution to strike statutes that the court disagreed with. The Eighth Circuit, though not using the Constitution to strike the statutes, has
stated that unless Congress clearly states its intent as to every application, the statute will not
be applied. See 626 F.2d at 1369. In either case, the courts have placed their prejudices and
beliefs before the mandate of Congress.
107. See supra note 4.
108. See Bledsoe, 674 F.2d at 664.
109. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 22 (2d Cir. 1983), where the court, in
dicta, stated that a 10(b)(5) Securities violation is a per se RICO violation.
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fees,' 1 o liberal venue requirements,"' and federal jurisdiction," 2 RICO is
becoming a powerful, and lucrative, plaintiff's and prosecutor's tool.
ChristopherMcIntire

110. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c) (West 1984).
111. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1965(a) (West 1984).
112. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(a) (West 1984).

B.

Tax

1. IRS Strikes Out In Attempt To Revoke Tax-Exempt Status Of
Amateur Baseball Organization
The Internal Revenue Code provides tax-exempt status to corporations organized exclusively for charitable or educational purposes.1 The
Federal Income Tax Regulations define charitable ". . . in its generally
accepted legal sense and is, therefore, not to be construed as limited by
the separate enumeration in Section 501(c)(3) of other tax-exempt purposes which may fall within the broad outlines of 'charity' as developed
by judicial decision." 2
The definition is ambiguous in identifying the specific activities
which may be classified as charitable. In Hutchinson Baseball Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, the Tenth Circuit added the promotion of
amateur baseball to the list of charitable activities. The Hutchinson court
held that an organization which promotes recreational and amateur
sports falls within the definition of a charitable organization for tax-exempt purposes and should be classified as such by the Internal Revenue.4
In Hutchinson, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue appealed a
decision by the United States Tax Court.' The tax court held that
Hutchinson Baseball Enterprises, Inc. ("Hutchinson") was exempt from
federal income taxation. Originally, Hutchinson incorporated for nonprofit purposes6 under Kansas law and filed an application for tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3). The Commissioner issued an
advance ruling granting Hutchinson tax-exempt status for two years.7
At the end of the advance ruling period, Hutchinson, was to provide
financial statements to determine whether it was receiving public support
in order to avoid private foundation status. After reviewing Hutchinson's financial statements, the Commissioner filed an adverse determination, finding that Hutchinson no longer met the requirements for exempt
status.8
1. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976).
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2), T.D. 7428, 1976-3 C.B. 435, 436.

3. 696 F.2d 757 (10th Cir. 1982).
4. Id.
5. Hutchinson Baseball Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 144 (1979).
6. One of the stated purposes in the articles of incorporation was "to promote, advance
and sponsor baseball, which shall include little league and amateur baseball in the Hutchinson,
Kansas area." Hutchinson, 696 F.2d at 758.
7. Hutchinson, 73 T.C. at 146.
8. Id. at 147.
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Hutchinson was involved in several activities. It owned and operated the Hutchinson Broncos ("Broncos") baseball team. 9 The team was
comprised of college aged men who received no compensation for playing for the Broncos. The players were guaranteed employment in local
industry. Additionally, lodging was furnished by Hutchinson.' 0
Although the Broncos played in a semi-professional league, the tax court
found that they were an amateur team."1
Hutchinson also leased and maintained a playing field for the Broncos and two American Legion teams. Hutchinson assumed the lease
from the American Legion on the condition that the American Legion
retain rent-free use of the field. 2 Hutchinson received exclusive concession rights and profits from all events held at the playing field. The field
was also rented to a local junior college for a nominal fee. Hutchinson
raised money through ticket sales, advertising, concession rights, contribution solicitation and through operation of the Broncos. 3 Hutchinson
also sponsored little league baseball and provided baseball camps for
children. The members of the Broncos acted as coaches for these events.
Hutchinson appealed the Commissioner's adverse determination. 4
The tax court held in favor of Hutchinson overruling the Commissioner's
determination. The Commissioner appealed the tax court decision on
the grounds that the main activity of Hutchinson was the operation of
the Broncos and consequently was not a charitable activity.'"
Section 501(3)(c) establishes three requirements in order to qualify
for tax-exempt status.' 6 First, the corporation must be organized and
operated exclusively for exempt purposes; second, no part of the corporation's net earnings may incur to the benefit of any shareholder or individual; and finally, the corporation must not engage in political campaigns
or, to a substantial extent, in lobbying activities."' Only the first requirement was at issue in Hutchinson.
Initially, the activities of the corporation must be within the broad
definition of charitable. Thereafter, it must be determined that the cor9. Hutchinson, 696 F.2d at 758.

10. Id.
11. Hutchinson, 73 T.C. at 147. This determination was not challenged on appeal. Perhaps the Commissioner should have argued this point. Had it been argued successfully, this
would have taken Hutchinson out of § 501(c)(3) because it would have lacked the requisite
exclusive charitable purpose necessary to receive tax-exempt status.
12. Hutchinson, 696 F.2d at 758.
13. Id. at 759.
14. Hutchinson, 73 T.C. at 155-56.
15. Hutchinson, 696 F.2d at 760.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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poration is organized exclusively for one or more tax-exempt purposes.
An organization may participate in activities which are considered commercial, and yet, it may still qualify as a charitable organization if the
primary purpose of its activities is charitable. 8 The Commissioner argued that the predominant function of Hutchinson was to support the
Broncos, and therefore, it should be disqualified from exemption under
Section 501 (c)(3)."9
In upholding the decision, the Tenth Circuit applied the tax court's
reasoning.2" The tax court stated that promotion of recreational and amateur baseball was not specifically listed as one of the enumerated classifications for charitable organizations.2 1 This was the first opportunity the
tax court had to consider the validity of an amateur baseball corporation
as a charitable organization.2 2
Prior to the 1976 amendment to Section 501(c)(3), inequity existed
in the granting of tax-exempt status. Some amateur sports organizations
received tax-exempt status while others did not. 23 The 1976 amendment
was included to clarify Section 501(c)(3) and to include organizations
which promoted national and international amateur sports. 24 The wording of the amendment precludes amateur organizations that provide athletic equipment and facilities from qualifying for exempt status.
However, the Joint Committee stated that the restriction on the provision of athletic facilities and equipment was intended to exclude only
social-type clubs.25
18. Northern California Central Services, Inc. v. U.S., 591 F.2d 620, 625 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
19. The tax court noted that Hutchinson marked the first time that the court interpreted
the meaning of the phrase found in § 501(c)(3), "but only if no part of its activities involve the
provision of athletic facilities or equipment." The qualification was added in the 1976 amendment to § 501. Hutchinson, 73 T.C. at 153.
20. Hutchinson, 696 F.2d at 762.
21. Hutchinson, 73 T.C. at 153. Some of the classifications for exempt status listed in
§ 501(c)(3) include organizations operating exclusively for religious, scientific, prevention of
cruelty to children or animals and literary purposes.
22. Id.
23. Hutchinson, 696 F.2d at 761 n.2.
24. Id.
25. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) provides in pertinent part that:
Corporations,. . . organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national
or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities in[may be exempt from
volve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), ...
taxation].
The statute states that no sports organization may qualify if it provides facilities or equipment
for its members. There is no suggestion in the statute that the intention was to exclude only
social clubs. This is only evident by reading the legislative history. Perhaps the Legislature
should have specifically eliminated social organizations if that was the intent. In attempting to
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The Hutchinson court established a two-step process for determining if an organization meets the requirement of being organized and operated exclusively for exempt purposes.26 The organization must first
show that it was organized for a charitable purpose that is advanced
through its activities.2 7 Although the organization may engage in exempt and nonexempt activities, "the operational test is satisfied only if
the predominant motivation for engaging in such activity is for an exempt purpose."2 The court found that Hutchinson satisfied this threshold requirement since it was established to promote amateur baseball2 9 as
evidenced by its involvement in activities for children and young men.
The Commissioner argued that Hutchinson's main activity was the operation of the Broncos, and that this did not serve an educational or exempt purpose. 30 The presence of a single non-exempt purpose, if
substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption, regardless of the
number or importance of truly exempt purposes. 3 ' The court, however,
held that operation of the Broncos was an exempt activity even though it
was a commercial venture. The Broncos were an amateur team and because the team contributed to the exempt activities, the primary purpose
of the Broncos's activities was charitable, and therefore, exempt.
The Hutchinson case expands the already broad definition of charity. Previously, promoting sports for individuals under eighteen years of
age qualified for exemption under Section 501(c)(3), 32 while promoting
sports for all members of the public did not qualify.3 3 Hutchinson extends the age limitation to college aged individuals.
The Hutchinson court implies that Hutchinsoh could have qualified
as an organization organized and operated for educational purposes.34
Other decisions have stated that promoting sports was a way of improving or developing a person's capabilities, regardless of the age of the participant.3 5 In order to prevent further inequity, the court clarified the
clarify the statute, the Legislature has also failed to clarify the amendment. Hutchinson, 696
F.2d at 761 n.2.
26. Id. at 760.
27. Id.
28. Hutchinson, 73 T.C. 154 (citing B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352, 357
(1978)).
29. Hutchinson, 696 F.2d at 762.
30. Id. at 762.
31. Better Business Bureau v. U.S., 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945).
32. Rev. Rul. 80-215, 1980-2 C.B. 174.
33. Rev. Rul. 70-4, 1970-1 C.B. 126.
34. Hutchinson, 696 F.2d at 761.
35. Rev. Rul. 77-365, 1977-2 C.B. 192 (amplifying Rev. Rul. 65-2, 1965-1 C.B. 227).
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requirements for tax-exempt status for an amateur sports organization.3 6
Hutchinson enables greater numbers of amateur sports organizations
to qualify under Section 501(c)(3). An organization may qualify by
sponsoring athletic clinics under the enumerated classification of education. It may also qualify under the 1976 amendment even if it provides
athletic facilities or equipment and even if it promotes sports among
young adults.3 7 The statutory interpretation provided in Hutchinson
should encourage nonprofit sports organizations to apply for tax-exempt
status under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Stephanie Marie Davis
36. Hutchinson, 696 F.2d at 761-62 n.2.
37. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976).

